The post-Bashir period in Sudan, from 2020 to 2021, initially offered a unique opportunity for political and economic transformation. After the United States removed Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in late 2020, the country gained access to international financial support from institutions like the IMF and World Bank, alongside promises of investment guarantees and development aid. Sudan also qualified for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative, potentially reducing its external debt by over $50 billion. Optimism was high that Sudan could stabilize its economy and advance democratic reforms. However, this brief window of opportunity collapsed in October 2021 when a military coup dismantled the fragile civilian-military coalition, derailing democratic progress and suspending the debt relief program. Today, Sudan remains embroiled in conflict and faces a severe humanitarian crisis.
Sudan’s experience highlights that sanctions relief and external economic support alone cannot dismantle entrenched patronage networks, security coalitions, or illicit economic structures that persist after decades of authoritarian rule. Similarly, civic institutions and independent organizations weakened under long-term repression do not automatically regenerate. These lessons are highly relevant for the United States as it considers stabilizing and rebuilding Venezuela’s economy following the capture of Nicolás Maduro. Both countries share histories of authoritarian mismanagement, exploitation of natural resources by regime-connected actors, mass emigration, entrenched security apparatuses, and weakened civil society, leaving democratic institutions fragile.
One key lesson from Sudan is the importance of phased, conditional sanctions relief. In Sudan, sanctions were lifted without ensuring irreversible democratic or institutional reforms, leaving the United States with limited leverage when the October 2021 coup occurred. In Venezuela, strategic use of sanctions could be tied to verifiable reforms, such as political prisoner releases, freedom of assembly, independent management of oil revenues, central bank independence, and progress in electoral preparations. Benchmarks must represent durable institutional changes that are difficult to reverse, ensuring that sanctions relief reinforces long-term democratic gains rather than providing immediate, unearned economic benefits to spoilers.
Another lesson is the need for clear guidance to the private sector. Following Sudan’s delisting from the SST list, US companies remained hesitant to invest due to political uncertainty, corruption, weak financial infrastructure, and lack of functioning correspondent banking relationships. For Venezuela, private sector reengagement will require addressing these structural impediments. This could include sector-specific guidance, rebuilding banking channels, political risk insurance for early investors, and transparent conditions under which sanctions could be reinstated. Without these measures, sanctions removal alone risks leaving Venezuela economically isolated, similar to Sudan.
Finally, strategic economic incentives and technical assistance are crucial. In Sudan, aid and investment support arrived too slowly and lacked coordination with private capital and capacity-building initiatives. In Venezuela, the United States can support institutional credibility through infrastructure investment guarantees, export promotion, preferential reconstruction contracts, and debt restructuring. Technical assistance is critical for restoring monetary policy independence, credible economic data collection, and transparent fiscal management, ideally coordinated with multilateral institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank. Rapid, coordinated support will help ensure the population sees tangible benefits from democratic transition and empower opposition leaders to resist authoritarian interference.
While Venezuela has advantages Sudan lacked, including extensive oil infrastructure, proximity to stable democracies, and a large diaspora, these strengths will matter little if the United States repeats Sudan’s mistakes by assuming that sanctions relief alone will trigger economic recovery. Sudan’s collapse illustrates the risks of poorly timed, insufficiently scaled economic statecraft, offering the United States an opportunity to apply these lessons in crafting a more effective and durable strategy for Venezuela.
