Ukraine has endured the fourth winter since the full-scale invasion by Russia, surviving conditions that were deliberately engineered to break civilian resilience. Throughout the cold months, Moscow repeatedly targeted power and heating infrastructure with the apparent aim of forcing millions of Ukrainians into submission during subzero temperatures. While such tactics have been used each winter, the most recent campaign reached an unprecedented scale, with widespread and sustained strikes on energy systems across the country.
In January, United Nations officials reported regular attacks on energy infrastructure spanning seventeen regions. By the end of winter, all of Ukraine’s thermal power plants had either been damaged or destroyed. In cities such as Kyiv, thousands of residential buildings were left without central heating for prolonged periods. Although municipal authorities reported no deaths directly linked to these outages, some observers remain uncertain whether the official figures fully capture the human impact.
Ukraine’s ability to withstand these extreme conditions has been driven by rapid adaptation and improvisation. In the face of systematic attacks, the country has effectively developed a new operational approach to maintaining heating services during wartime. This emerging model of resilience is not only significant for Ukraine but also offers valuable insights for other countries facing potential threats to civilian infrastructure.
A key feature of Ukraine’s approach is the shift away from centralized systems toward decentralized and flexible solutions. As large heating plants became prime targets for missile and drone strikes, operators increasingly turned to mobile cogeneration units. These compact systems are capable of producing both electricity and heat independently of the national grid, allowing critical services to continue functioning even when central infrastructure is compromised.
By November 2025, Ukraine’s district heating sector was operating hundreds of cogeneration units alongside numerous modular boiler systems. This transition enabled the creation of localized “energy islands” that could sustain hospitals, water utilities, and residential areas. What makes this shift particularly notable is the speed of implementation. While infrastructure upgrades in many European countries can take years due to procurement and regulatory processes, Ukrainian operators managed to deploy these decentralized systems within days under emergency conditions.
This transformation was not the result of long-term planning but rather a necessity born out of continuous crisis. Over time, Ukraine has developed a rapid repair and response doctrine that includes pre-positioned spare parts, streamlined communication protocols, and decentralized decision-making at the municipal level. This approach minimizes delays and allows local authorities to respond quickly without being hindered by bureaucratic procedures.
An assessment by the International Energy Agency published in early 2026 highlighted Ukraine’s emergency response capabilities as a potential model for other countries. The findings are particularly relevant for Central and Eastern Europe, where many nations rely heavily on district heating systems similar to those in Ukraine. Countries such as Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Baltic states continue to depend on centralized infrastructure dating back to the Soviet era, making them vulnerable to similar forms of disruption.
Despite these risks, preparedness across the region remains limited. Crisis response mechanisms are largely untested, and constrained municipal budgets often prioritize routine maintenance over investments in cybersecurity or system resilience. At the same time, emerging threats suggest that attacks on energy infrastructure may not be limited to physical bombardment. Cyberattacks are increasingly becoming a critical concern.
This risk became evident in January 2024, when malware disrupted heating services in hundreds of apartment buildings in Lviv, marking the first known cyberattack targeting municipal heating systems. Subsequent research has identified similar vulnerabilities in other European countries, including Lithuania and Romania. In late 2025, a coordinated cyberattack on a major heating and power plant in Poland, which serves nearly half a million customers, revealed how deeply such systems can be infiltrated, with evidence suggesting that attackers had gained access months in advance.
Ukraine’s experience has provided it with a unique understanding of how these threats evolve and how to respond effectively. However, this knowledge has not yet been fully integrated into European preparedness strategies. While discussions around collective cybersecurity and infrastructure resilience are gaining traction, the pace of policy development does not yet match the urgency of the threat.
Existing frameworks for regional cooperation could help bridge this gap. Institutions such as the Energy Community Secretariat already connect Ukraine with its European neighbors and have established agreements related to district heating coordination. Additionally, the European Union’s Preparedness Union Strategy outlines a range of actions aimed at strengthening crisis resilience. However, there is still no comprehensive mechanism to systematically transfer Ukraine’s practical experience into broader European planning and implementation.
Ukraine is now taking steps to formalize the lessons learned during wartime. In early 2026, the country’s National Security and Defense Council approved energy resilience plans for all regions, focusing on protecting critical infrastructure, expanding cogeneration capacity, and advancing decentralized heating and water supply systems. These measures represent a shift from reactive improvisation to structured national strategy.
Ukraine did not choose to become a testing ground for the resilience of civilian heating systems under attack, but its experience has generated valuable knowledge. As the country continues to refine its approach, the challenge for Europe is whether it can learn from these lessons in time or risk facing similar threats without the benefit of preparation.
